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THE "AFFIRMATIVE ACTION" FRAUD
LINO A. GRA GLIA*
To discuss so-called "affirmative action" usefully, it is essential
that we be clear as to what we are talking about. We are talking about
racial preferences, the practice of racial discrimination; apart from
that, there is no controversy and nothing to debate. "Affirmative
action" has become simply a deceptive label for racial preferences.
The central question presented, therefore, is whether government and
government supported institutions should grant preference to some
individuals, and thereby necessarily disfavor others, on the basis of
race. 1 For the ordinary American citizen, the answer could not be
more clear. Such discrimination plainly violates the basic American
ideal that all persons are equal before the law and must be treated as
individuals, not as members of racial groups. The 1954 Brown v.
Board of Education2 decision was understood to make this ideal a
matter of constitutional principle. Acting on that understanding,
Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act to make it national
statutory law.3
It is sufficient ground for opposition to racial preference
programs, at least in higher education, that nothing should be done by
public institutions that cannot be done openly. The whole point of all
racial preference programs is to evade and camouflage the fact that
the groups preferred by the programs cannot otherwise compete with
* A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law, Austin, Texas.
1. See generally, Lino A. Graglia, Racial Preferences in Admission to Institutions of
Higher Education, in THE IMPERILED ACADEMY 127 (Howard Dickman ed. 1993).
2. Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 489 (1954).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,2000a-h (1970),78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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others for admission to selective institutions of higher education on
the basis of the standard criteria for academic achievement or ability.
It is necessary, therefore, that misdirection and concealment
characterize every aspect of such programs. For example, racial
preference programs in admission to institutions of higher education
were initially put forward as programs for the "culturally or
educationally deprived," though they were, and are, based only on
race.4 It was, and sometimes still is, said that the ordinary admission
criteria applied to whites are "culturally biased" against blacks and
members of some other (but, strangely, not all) minority racial
groups, even though it is known that the criteria do not
underpredict-they typically overpredict-the academic performance
of the racially preferred.5
The argument most frequently heard today for racial preference in
higher education is simply that without it, blacks, the primary
intended beneficiaries, would be "underrepresented" or, more
typically, "grossly underrepresented" in such institutions.6 The
fallacies of this argument are many. First, it is not really an argument
at all, but merely an assertion of the tautology that more blacks
should be admitted to institutions of higher education in order that
there be more blacks in such institutions.7 It does not offer a reason
why an additional black entrant should be considered more desirable
than an additional equally or even better qualified white entrant.
Second, the argument assumes, contrary to the principle of political
equality, that racial groups rather than individuals are the relevant
entities.8
Third, the argument fails because institutions of higher education
4. See Lino A. Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 351 (1970).
5. See ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES 103 (1985); ABILITY TESTING: USE,
CONSEQUENCES, AND CONTROVERSIES 73 (Alexandra K. Wigdor & Wendell R. Gamer, eds.,
1985).
6. See Lino A. Graglia, "Affirmative Action, " Past Present and Future, 22 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 1207, 1212-13 (1996) (citing Thomas J. Ginger, Affirmative Action: Answer for Law
Schools, 28 How. L.L 701, 704 (1984) ("[W]ithout remedial admissions programs, the number
of minority students in law schools would be insignificant.")).
7. See id. at 1212.
8. See id.
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are not, in any event, meant to be representative institutions.9 It never
happens in the world, and there is no reason to expect, that members
of all racial or ethnic groups will appear proportionately in different
occupations or activities.10 Finally, blacks are not in fact
"underrepresented," but rather "overrepresented"--that is, their
numbers are disproportionately high-in institutions of higher
education once IQ scores are taken into account." In general, more
than half of the students in the bottom ten percent of a school's IQ
range will be black.'
2
The most common substantive argument for "affirmative action"
in higher education, as in other areas, is that it provides a "remedy"
for disadvantages resulting from past racial discrimination.' 3 The
argument is obviously fallacious in that it is not possible to remedy
an injury to "A" caused by "B" by giving a benefit to "C" at the
expense of "D." Further, if remedying disadvantage were the
concern, disadvantage, not race, would be the criterion. Race cannot
be used as a proxy for disadvantage because not all blacks, and not
only blacks, have suffered disadvantage. 14 Indeed, blacks who apply
to institutions of higher education are typically among the most
advantaged. The real plight of the "underclass" creates sympathy and
support for racial preferences, but very few members of that class,
unfortunately, apply for admission to selective colleges and
universities.'
5
9. See id.
10. See THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTENTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
(1990).
11. See RICHARD J. HERNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE 319-20 (1994).
12. Seeid. at472.
13. See Arval A. Morris, New Light on Racial Affirmative Action, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
219, 223 (1987) ("[AlIl affirmative action is remedial, looking backwards and presupposing a
prior wrong."); K.G. Jan Pillai, Affirmative Action: In Search of a National Policy, 2 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) ("[O]nly blacks (and American Indians) have a
constitutionally cognizable claim for remedial preferences to compensate for past racial
discrimination and its lingering effects."); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and
Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 11 (1995) ("the disadvantages that individual members of
racial minority groups have suffered as a result of... past discrimination should be neutralized
through the implementation of make-whole remedies.").
14. See Carol R Goforth, 'What Is She?' How Race Matters and Why It Should, 46
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 96 (1996).
15. See Glenn Lowry, The Moral Quandary of the Black Community, 79 THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, Spring 1980, at 20; Richard Epstein, Affirmative Action in Law Schools: The Uneasy
1998]
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Racial discrimination in higher education does not typically stop
with admission, but extends to the grant, often automatic, of financial
benefits. At the University of Texas Law School, for example, the
specially admitted children of well-off black professionals-judges,
lawyers, doctors, businessmen-were automatically awarded
unneeded financial aid that better qualified white students in real
need were denied. My colleagues frequently point out to me that, as a
believer in free markets, I am in no position to object to this. The
blacks are simply selling what the school thinks it needs, black faces,
and in a market economy, you must expect to pay for your needs.
As the remedy rationale for racial preferences has become more
obviously untenable, its proponents have increasingly relied on the
argument that it provides a needed educational "diversity." Selection
of students by race, however, provides "diversity" in nothing but
race. The typical black applicant to an institution of higher education
comes from a middle or upper middle class background not readily
distinguishable from that of the typical white applicant. If diversity of
views or experience were the objective, one would expect to see a
preference for foreign students or members of minority religions,
which is not the case.
The irrelevance of the remedy and diversity arguments to
"affirmative action" in higher education is shown by the fact that no
black has ever been denied preferential admission to the University of
Texas Law School, for example, on the ground that he was not
economically or culturally advantaged (or, indeed, that he was
exceptionally advantaged). In addition, no black applicant has ever
been denied preferential admission because his background and
views seemed indistinguishable from those of the average white. It
was only necessary, and it was entirely sufficient, that he be black.
Racial preferences necessarily lead to the formation of
organizations on racial lines in order to fight for and defend against
preferences. We now have black caucuses and Hispanic caucuses in
state and national legislatures, the raison d'etre of which is to fight
for even more preference for their racial group. There are no white
caucuses, which means that discrimination against whites is
Truce, 2 KAN J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 40 (1992).
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politically costless. It is not costless, however, in the hostilities
engendered.
The many arguments once offered for racially preferential
admission to institutions of higher education-biased tests, remedy,
diversity, role models, etc.-have more recently come down to a
single one: "We can't have" (i.e., it is not politically feasible to have)
"an all-white institution." America is in no danger of its selective
institutions of higher education becoming all white. Asian
Americans, comprising less than four percent of the population, now
account for twenty-four percent of the student bodies at Harvard and
Columbia, and over thirty-five percent at Berkeley and other schools
of the University of California. We seem generally to have no
difficulty in accepting gross racial and ethnic disproportions in
educational institutions and elsewhere. For example, Jews make up
about forty percent of many law faculties, Asians dominate Ph.D.'s in
math and science, and blacks make up two-thirds of the players in
professional football and four-fifths in basketball.
Putting all questions of principle aside, however, racial
preferences must be opposed on the purely practical ground that the
size of the preferences typically involved is so large that their use
cannot operate to increase racial equality or respect. For example, in
1988, the difference between the combined SAT score of the average
white and the average black admitted to the University of California
at Berkeley was 288 points, and the gap between blacks and Asians
was even larger.' 6 At the graduate and professional school level the
problem is, if anything, even more intractable. According to a recent
article in American Lawyer, for example, of all law school applicants
in 1996-97, only 103 blacks and 224 Hispanics had a college grade-
point average (GPA) of 3.25 or better and a Law School Admission
Test (LSAT) score at or above the 83.5 percentile. 17 Only sixteen
blacks and forty-five Hispanics had a GPA of 3.50 or better and an
LSAT score at or above the 92.3 percentile. Those are good scores,
but not nearly good enough for admission to the most selective
(roughly top ten) law schools. The average applicant admitted to the
16. See HERNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 11, at 452.
17. See AMERICAN LAwYER, Nov. 1997, at 4.
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University of California at Berkeley Law School (Boalt Hall), for
example, had a GPA of 3.74 and an LSAT score at the 97.7
percentile.
The virtual nonexistence of blacks at the level of academic
achievement required for admission to highly selective schools means
that their admission in substantial numbers requires that the ordinary
admission criteria be not merely bent or relaxed, but virtually
ignored. Blacks must be admitted with credentials indicating a level
of preparation and achievement that means that most of them will be
far from competitive with the fully qualified admitees. The
unavoidable result is humiliation, frustration, and a resentful
realization that they have been misled, not done a favor, by university
officials who had assured them they could compete. Protests against
"racism" naturally come to be seen as a more productive activity than
academic endeavor. Frustration necessarily leads to demands that the
conditions of competition be changed. Black, ethnic, and
"multicultural" studies will have to be added to the curriculum, and
grading standards will have to be changed. As it would be self-
defeating to permit open discussions of racial preference, "hate-
speech" codes will have to be adopted, "political correctness"
enforced, and "sensitivity training" programs instituted.
Because opposition and, indeed, all discussion of racial
preferences must be suppressed, their use is inconsistent with
academic freedom and a university atmosphere of open inquiry.
Indeed, it is only the employment of tactics of intimidation,
successfully silencing opposition, that has allowed discrimination
against whites to persist and expand. It is not too much to say that
racial preferences, and, therefore, the admission of substantially
underqualified students, are the source of virtually every major
problem of education policy plaguing the American campus today.
Law schools, the leading proponents and practitioners of racial
preferences, can easily be cavalier about standards since, after all,
what real harm can an incompetent lawyer do? But as Bob Zelnick
has pointed out in his recent book Backfire,18 the effects of racial
18. BOB ZELNICK, BACKFIRE (1996).
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preferences are more serious in the medical profession.19 On the 1988
National Board exams for doctors, he notes, pass rates were eighty-
eight percent for whites, eighty-four for Asians, sixty-six for
Hispanics, and forty-nine for blacks.20 Admission to medical school
is, of course, highly competitive, but "affirmative action"
routinely denies admission to more qualified whites and Asians
and provides admission to less qualified blacks and Hispanics.
The evidence is overwhelming that this gap carries over into
performance in medical school and on the qualifying exam to
become a doctor. As early as 1976, Professor Bernard Davis of
Harvard Medical School chronicled the erosion of standards
after Harvard decided to reserve twenty percent of each
medical school class for minorities. First, required science
courses were dropped when it became clear minorities fared
poorly in them. Next, a pass-fail grading system replaced
traditional letter grades. Then, simply passing the national
medical boards was determined to be adequate. When
minorities failed their boards in disproportionate numbers, they
were given five opportunities to pass, and when this proved
insufficient, the provision was waived altogether.
The conclusion is inescapable: because of racial
preferences, this country is producing doctors who are
substantially less qualified than those who would be starting
the practice of medicine if racial preferences were abandoned.
The same society that keeps potentially useful drugs off the
market until they are tested for a near-eternity, that bans
carcinogens that must be consumed by the gallon to produce
harm-this society consciously and deliberately graduates
doctors who are less qualified to treat the sick than would be
the case if admissions to medical school were based purely on
ability and not on race.2
1
Surely the most socially destructive effect of racial preferences,
however, will prove to be that preferences will be taken to establish
19. See id. at 152.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 151-52 (emphasis in original).
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what may come to be known as a general "Black Exemption." If
blacks cannot be expected to meet the requirements applicable to
others in admission to institutions of higher education, why should
they be expected to meet other requirements? The essential message
of preferences is that blacks are just "too different" from others to be
expected to comply with the rules and standards applicable to others.
Unfortunately, a general understanding and acceptance of this
message is not consistent with the maintenance of a viable multiracial
society.
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